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We examine the effect of remittances on private sector credit in the Pacific Island 
countries (PICs) using the data from 58 developing countries from 2004 to 2016. The 
analysis provides strong evidence that the effect of remittance inflows on private 
sector credit for PICs is positive and higher than that for other developing countries. 
In addition, the per capita gross domestic product, official development assistance, 
the number of bank branches, and institutional quality are also positively associated 
with private sector credit in PICs, while the Consumer Price Index is negatively 
associated with private sector credit. These results have important implications for the 
development of financial sector in PICs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, remittances have emerged as an alternative source of 
external finance. More importantly, their use has significantly increased in recent 
decades and they have become one of the most important sources of external 
funding for several developing countries. The World Bank (2018) estimates that 
international migrants from low- and middle-income countries sent US$528 
billion in remittances in 2018, a 10.8% rise compared to 2017. In 2019, remittance 
inflows to low- and middle-income countries were expected to increase by 4% 
and reach an estimated US$549 billion (World Bank, 2018). In 2018, remittance 
inflows to all regions increased significantly. Europe and Central Asia experienced 
a 20% increase in remittance inflows, while South Asia recorded a 13.5% increase, 
followed by Sub-Saharan Africa, which experienced a 9.8% boost in remittance 
inflows. Remittance inflows increased by 9.3% in Latin America, followed by 9.1% 
growth in the Middle East and North Africa, followed by 6.6% growth in East Asia 
and the Pacific.
The increasing trend in remittances has motivated researchers to examine the 
impact of remittances on various developmental dimensions, including that on 
financial development. However, the impact of remittances on financial sector 
development, particularly private sector credit, is puzzling. 
Theoretically, there are two contradicting views on the influence of 
remittances on credit (Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Pería, 2011). One point of 
view advocates that remittances complement private sector credit in developing 
countries. Accordingly, remittances complement private sector credit through 
various channels. On the demand side, they directly contribute to the development 
of financial literacy in remittance-receiving households (Orozco and Fedewa, 
2005; Cirasino, Guadamillas, and Salinas, 2008). They also improve recipient 
households’ trust in the banking sector, further encouraging them to seek loans 
and other financial services from the financial sector (Desai, Kapur, and McHale, 
2004). On the supply side, the fixed cost associated with the transfer of remittances 
compels the remitters to accumulate and transfer large sums at a time, giving the 
more cash than what is needed in the immediate time period. Households are thus 
likely to open bank accounts and deposit the surplus cash for safekeeping for a 
certain period, which likely increases private sector credit (Aggarwal et al., 2011; 
Brown, Carmignani, and Fayad, 2013). 
In contrast, the other view claims that remittances are likely to substitute 
for private sector credit. Accordingly, the availability of remittances lowers 
households’ financial constraints and could therefore reduce their demand for 
credit. According to Brown and Foster (1994), Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), 
and, recently, Bangake and Eggoh (2019), for example, remittances provide an 
alternative means of finance for investment in physical as well as human capital. 
The substitutability hypothesis is also supported by Inoue (2018), where different 
types of financial development remittance inflows can work interchangeably to 
help mitigate poverty conditions in developing countries. Similarly, remittance-
receiving households could also use most or all of the remittances for consumption 
purposes, and the remittances might thus not necessarily boost the volume of 
deposits in the banking sector. In addition, Bhattacharya, Inekwe, and Paramati 
(2018) note inconclusive findings regarding a complementary or bidirectional 
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relation between remittance flows and private sector credit. More recently, Akçay 
(2019) has observed a U-shaped relation between remittances and private sector 
credit in the both long and short run. The theoretical argument provided above 
clearly shows that the nature of the impact of remittances on credit is ambiguous 
and is generally an empirical issue.
In light of the debate concerning the theoretical link between remittances and 
credit, this paper examines the impact of remittances on private sector credit, 
specifically for small Pacific Island countries (PICs), using panel analysis over 
the period from 2004 to 2016. This study is essential for the following reasons. 
First, in light of the unique characteristics of PICs, the influence of remittances on 
credit cannot be assumed to be the same as that of other countries, as noted from 
either time series studies, cross-sectional, or panel studies. Therefore, one cannot 
rely on evidence from earlier studies to make conclusions about the influence 
of remittances on the private sector credit, especially for PICs. The reasons for 
assuming that the incremental influence of remittances will differ for PICs are 
attributed to the special characteristics of their financial systems. Financial systems 
in PICs are dominated by the banking sector, which is characterized by very few 
banks, limited numbers of bank branches, foreign ownership, an urban focus, 
excess liquidity, a lack of competition, high-profit margins, and excessive interest 
rate spreads (Asian Development Bank, 2001).
Similarly, the state-owned banks in most PICs nearly failed in the 1990s, and 
the banking sector thus lacks visibility in rural areas, and significant proportions 
of poor and rural households still do not have a bank account (Asian Development 
Bank, 2001). In some PICs, less than one-10th of the population owns a bank 
account, and, overall, over 80% of the population in PICs has no access to any 
financial services. Excess liquidity in the financial system is attributed to projects 
of limited profitability and the inability of households to take out loans due to the 
lack of collateral (largely because of poorly defined land rights) and the absence 
of cash flow records. An influx of remittances in PICs is likely to promote private 
sector credit development. Remittance transfers, particularly through the banking 
system, are likely to provide valuable information about the financial status of 
remittance-receiving households, improve financial literacy (which is immensely 
lacking in PICs), provide a stable source of revenue for poor households, build 
trust between banks and clients, and consequently create greater demand for and 
supply of private sector credit. Overall, remittances are likely to reduce the fear of 
default, which is otherwise very high in PICs.
Second, there is generally a lack of conclusive empirical evidence on the 
influence of remittances on private sector credit. For instance, Giuliano and Marta 
(2009), in the case of 100 countries, and Brown et al. (2013), in a study of Azerbaijan 
and Kyrgyzstan, note that increases in remittance inflows are negatively associated 
with the demand for private sector credit. In contrast, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011) 
observe that remittances strongly contribute to denser branch networks in Mexico. 
Similarly, Aggarwal et al. (2011) observe that remittances enhance financial 
sector development by extending credit to remittance recipients in the case of 109 
developing countries. In another similar study, Aggarwal, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Martinez Peria (2006) use data from 99 developing countries and find remittances 
to have a positive and significant effect on the ratios of bank deposits to the gross 
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domestic product (GDP) and of credit to the GDP, the latter relation being less 
robust. Fromentin (2017) finds that remittances have a positive influence on credit 
and notes that, in the long run, the influence is greater in the case of low-income 
countries relative to upper-middle-income countries. The positive effect also holds 
in the short run, except for low-income countries. In a more recent study with 
30 developing countries and 27 developed countries, Fromentin and Leon (2019) 
have observed a positive and significant impact of remittances on firm credit and 
total credit. However, they also find a negative but nonsignificant impact in the 
case of household credit. Cooray (2012) observes that remittances have a positive 
influence on credit in countries with limited ownership of banks. 
The evidence from the literature clearly demonstrates the impact of remittances 
on credit is not the same for all countries and could depend on the countries’ 
general characteristics, such as their level of development, financial system, and 
the purpose of the credit. In the context of Nigeria, Ajefu and Ogebe (2019) find 
that remittance inflows can significantly improve the use of financial services 
and promote financial sector development when transaction costs are reduced 
and there are minimal to no barriers. The authors find that remittances not only 
promote financial development in Nigeria through increased household demand 
for deposit bank accounts, but also encourage the adoption of mobile/internet 
banking.
In sum, numerous studies have examined the impact of remittances on credit; 
however, the evidence is mixed and inconclusive. Nevertheless, there is some 
consensus that the evidence is region or country specific. Moreover, little is known 
about the impact of remittances on credit in PICs. Using a unique data set from 
PICs, the current study addresses the gap in the literature by examining the impact 
of remittances on private sector credit in PICs.
In light of these considerations, we hypothesize that 1) remittances have 
a positive and significant impact on credit and 2) the impact of remittances on 
credit is greater in the PICs relative to other developing countries. To examine our 
hypothesis, we use system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. We 
find that remittances have a positive and statistically significant impact on private 
sector credit in less developed countries; however, the impact is higher for PICs 
relative to other countries in the sample. The positive impact of remittances on 
credit is consistent with findings of, for example, Fromentin (2017) and Aggarwal 
et al. (2006). Further robustness test confirms that the results are consistent with 
our initial findings. The findings indicate that PICs should encourage remittance 
inflows from emigrants due to their significant implications on financial sector 
development in the PICs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II provides an 
overview of remittances in the PICs, followed by the empirical model in Section 
III. Section IV outlines the results and discussion, and Section V concludes the 
paper by summarizing the major findings.
II. REMITTANCES IN PICs
Over the years, the PICs have experienced a continuous large-scale outmigration 
of its high-skilled labor force due to problems pertaining to economic pressures, 
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as well as the recent emergence of climate change and sea-level rise. Despite 
losing valuable human resources, many small PICs have also gained in terms 
of the generation of foreign exchange earnings through remittance inflows sent 
by emigrants (Mohanty, 2006). Remittances have become an integral feature of 
most Pacific Island economies, where most households depend primarily on cash 
income sent by their family members from abroad for consumption purposes 
(Connell and Brown, 2005).
Pacific Island economies are also experiencing fund leakage in terms of 
remittances paid. Expatriate workers from abroad are employed to supplement 
the skill gap in the workforce among PICs. On the positive side, outward 
remittances from Pacific Island nations have remained relatively constant for the 
past 39 years, from 1980 to 2019, as shown in Figure 1. Prior to 1999, inward and 
outward remittance flows were similar; however, remittance inflows significantly 
increased afterward, reaching over US$700 million in 2018. This upward trend 
signifies high-scale emigration from the PICs, and the cultural linkages among 
Pacific Islanders induce emigrants to send cash income to support their families 
and, indirectly, the overall economy.
Figure 1.
Remittance Received and Paid by the Small Pacific Island States
Figure presents remittances received and paid by the Small Pacific Island States. Data is taken from World Bank 
Development Indicators Database.
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Remittance inflows are particularly important in Samoa and Tonga, comprising 
28.26% of the GDP between 2010 and 2018, compared to an average of 18.77% for 
the other PICs. Table 1 shows the general trend of inward remittances in PICs. It is 
worth noting that remittances significantly boost the income-generating capacity 
of many PICs by driving consumption, domestic savings, and investments. From 
1980 to 1989, remittances consisted of 4.25% of the GDP of small PICs, rising 
significantly to an average of 7.15% from 2010 to 2018. On average, the remittance 
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inflows for Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Tonga are significantly higher than the 
world average, as well as the averages of other low- and middle-income countries. 
However, remittance inflows are significantly lagging in Papua New Guinea, 
compared to other PICs.
Table 1.
Remittance Inflows for Selected PICs
This table shows annual average remittance inflows as percentage of GDP over the periods 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 
2000-2009 and 2010-2018. The data are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators Database.
PICS
Annual average remittance inflows as a % of GDP
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2018
Fiji 1.45 1.54 5.32 5.03
Samoa 25.09 21.80 15.29 18.77
Vanuatu 6.63 6.16 2.31 2.64
Tonga 21.06 16.50 28.67 28.26
Papua New Guinea 0.24 0.34 0.14 0.04
Pacific Island Small States (average) 4.25 4.14 7.03 7.15
World (average) 0.40 0.35 0.53 0.70
Low & Middle Income (average) 1.16 1.13 1.64 1.51
III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. Empirical Methodology
The empirical literature analyzing the impact of remittances on private sector 
credit has outlined models to include indicators of income, inflation, official 
development assistance (ODA), and institutional quality (Brown et al., 2013; 
Fromentin and Leon, 2019; Opperman and Adjasi, 2019). This study uses this 
approach to examine the influence of remittances on private sector credit in 58 
developing countries over the period 2004–2016. To evaluate whether the impact 
of remittances on private sector credit differs for PICs, we use an interactive term 
between remittances and PIC, where the PIC variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the country is a PIC, and zero otherwise. We state our 
model as follows:
where, for country i and time t, pscit is private sector credit as a percentage of 
the GDP, remit is remittances as a percentage of the GDP, picit is the PIC dummy 
variable, remit× pici is the interaction term,1 and Xit is a vector of control factors that 
includes additional control factors such as the real GDP at constant 2010 prices 
(as a natural logarithm, denoted by lyit), the Consumer Price Index (CPI, denoted 
1 This interaction term between remittance and PIC is similar to the variable of Feeny, Iamsiraroj, 
and McGillivray (2014), who use an interaction term between foreign direct investment and PIC to 
examine the impact of foreign direct investment.
(1)
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by cpiit), the number of bank branches (as a natural logarithm, denoted by lcbbit), 
ODA (odait, measured by ODA inflows to the GDP ratio, as a percentage), the small 
island developing states, henceforth SIDS (a dummy variable, denoted by sidsi),2 
and a measure of institutional quality.
In terms of the control factors, first, this study uses the real GDP per capita 
as a measure of the level of economic development. A number of studies have 
argued that the level of a country’s development contributes positively to its 
private sector credit (Shan, Morris, and Sun, 2001; Brown et al., 2013; Fromentin, 
2017; Sharma and Syarifuddin, 2019). Economies with a higher GDP per capita are 
believed to have better economies of scale in organizing and supporting financial 
institutions. The real GDP per capita is widely used as a measure of a country’s 
level of economic development in studies on the link between remittances and 
financial development (e.g., Opperman and Adjasi, 2019). Economic development 
is hypothesized to require better financial development, which simultaneously 
contributes to financial development.
Second, a number of studies have used inflation as a control variable to factor 
in macroeconomic stability (Boyd, Levine, and Smith, 2001; Sharma, Tobing, and 
Azwar, 2018). Intuitively, a rising inflation rate reduces purchasing power, which 
leads to a reduction in savings and returns on savings. Hence, with a reduction 
in savings, credit becomes scarce, due to limited liquidity in the banking sector. 
Huybens and Smith (1999), Bittencourt (2011), and Opperman and Adjasi (2019), 
for example, note that inflation has a negative impact on private sector credit. 
Inflation rates (denoted by infit) and the CPI (cpiit) are used interchangeably as 
measures of inflation in studies examining the impact of remittances on financial 
sector development. Since more private sector credit can lead to higher inflation, 
the inflation indicator could be endogenous in the current model.
In addition, we use the number of bank branches to measure the financial 
system’s infrastructure. A better infrastructure facilitates household access 
to financial services and hence contributes directly to private sector credit 
development. We therefore hypothesize that the number of bank branches is 
positively associated with private sector credit. The development of private sector 
credit would, in turn, lead to greater access to financial services; the number of 
bank branches could therefore be endogenous.
Furthermore, due to the significant volume of ODA in the PICs and its 
critical role in financing many official development projects in these small states 
(Fromentin and Leon, 2019), ODA is widely used to measure external financial 
sources. The inclusion of this measure in the current model would provide an 
assessment of whether ODA complements or substitutes private sector credit. 
Since ODA allows developing countries to overcome financial difficulties due 
to an economic downturn or natural disaster, ODA is likely to have a positive 
spillover onto private sector credit (Becerra, Cavallo, and Noy, 2014). Hence, we 
hypothesize ODA to have a complementary effect, namely, we assume that ODA 
contributes positively to private sector credit. We further include a multiplicative 
2 PICs are part of SIDS. The data sample in this study covers 16 SIDS, including six from the Pacific 
and 10 from other regions.
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interactive term between ODA and the SIDS dummy variable to evaluate if the 
impact of ODA on credit in SIDS differs from that in developing countries overall.
Lastly, institutional quality is believed to contribute positively to a country’s 
development in all ways, including financial development (Opperman and Adjasi, 
2019). The institutional element has several dimensions, such as political stability 
(psit), regulatory quality (rqit), rule of law (rlit), governance effectiveness (geit), 
and voice accountability (vait). The estimated scores for these five institutional 
indicators range from -2.5 to 2.5. However, consensus is lacking on the consistently 
significant impacts of these institutional indicators in the literature. This is mainly 
due to measurement errors in institution indicators (El Hamma, 2017; Fagbemi 
and Ajibike, 2018; Opperman and Adjasi, 2019). To capture the effect of institutions 
and reduce the effects of measurement errors, we use the interactions of the two 
institution measures. Our analysis suggests that such terms as psit×vait, and psit×geit 
outperform single institution indicators, since the positive effects of the former 
are more consistent and significant. This result suggests that the interaction terms, 
which confirm institutional improvements only when two institutional dimensions 
develop in the same direction simultaneously, capture the development of 
institutions in an economy more accurately than a single institutional measure 
does. This study’s method of identifying institutional effects on development 
could comprise another contribution to the literature.
B. Data
The data are an annual time series. Our sample includes 58 developing countries 
over the period 2004–2016. The reason for covering 58 developing countries that 
include non-SIDS in the case study of PICs is mainly the lack of sufficient periods 
for SIDS and PICs. There are only 16 SIDS, which include only six PICs. Analysis 
with data on 16 SIDS or six PICs would yield unstable and biased estimation 
results. Nevertheless, regressions using the SIDS subsample are also conducted to 
serve as robustness analysis.
The data are collectively sourced from the World Bank’s and the International 
Monetary Fund’s databases. In particular, data for the real GDP per capita, ODA, and 
inflation rates are sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database, while data for domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio of the GDP 
and remittance inflows to the GDP are sourced from the World Bank’s Global 
Financial Development Database. Data for institutional quality measurements, 
such as political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, governance effectiveness, 
and voice accountability, are sourced from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
database. Additionally, data for the number of bank branches are sourced from 
the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Access Survey. Summary statistics of 
the key variables are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. Table A1 also lists the 
number of developing countries covered in this study.
IV. FINDINGS
Estimation of Equation (1) follows a specific-to-general approach, considering 
avoidance of the multicollinearity problem and spurious estimation results 
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by using all I(1) variables, addressing heteroskedasticity, and controlling for 
endogeneity by using system GMM estimators. The system GMM estimation 
results for all the countries and SIDS are summarized respectively in Tables 2 and 
3. The overall goodness of fit in the panel regressions varies from 0.3450 to 0.4003 
in the sample of 58 developing countries, and the overall goodness of fit in the 
regressions using 16 SIDS ranges only between 0.0545 and 0.1948. However, the 
empirical findings are generally consistent across the regressions in Tables 2 and 3. 
Further, the robustness analysis is conducted by including the growth of real per 
capita GDP (gyit) and inflation (infit) as alternatives to lyit and cpiit, respectively. The 
regressions are assessed with the Arellano–Bond dynamic panel data estimator, 
and the results are summarized in Table 4.
Specifically, remittances (remit) have a positive impact on private sector credit 
(pscit). The coefficient of 0.48 for remittances in the general regression in column (6) 
in Table 2 suggests that a one percentage point increase in the ratio of remittances to 
the GDP is associated with a 0.48 percentage point increase in private sector credit, 
ceteris paribus. The magnitude of such an impact is higher in the PICs (remit×pici) 
in the regressions using 58 countries. However, the impact of remittances in PICs 
becomes nonsignificant, indicating that, in terms of private sector credit, it is not 
significantly different compared to that of the other SIDS in the sample (see Table 
3). The overall magnitude of the impact of remittances in SIDS (see Table 3) is 
higher compared to that in the full sample (see Table 2). This finding is within our 
expectations and consistent with our hypothesis that the influence of remittances 
is higher in SIDS, such as the PICs. Access to private sector credit is likely more 
difficult in PICs, compared to other developing countries, due to higher credit 
risk in the region; however, the inflow of remittances improves households’ 
chances of accessing credit. Remittances provide a stable source of income for 
poor households, improve financial literacy, and build trust between banks and 
households; they therefore potentially have a huge impact on the demand for and 
supply of private sector credit in the region. The positive impact of remittances 
on private sector credit is consistent with that in, for example, Fromentin (2017), 
Aggarwal et al. (2006), and Opperman and Adjasi (2019).
The real GDP per capita (lyit) strongly contributes to private sector credit, with 
a coefficient of 45.7 in column (6) in Table 2, suggesting that a one percentage point 
increase in the real GDP per capita is associated with a 0.457 percentage point 
increase in private sector credit. The coefficient for lyit is large mainly because 
y is in logarithmic form while pscit is in levels. Such large coefficients of lyit are 
also found in the literature. For example, Aggarwal et al. (2011, p. 262) identify 
a coefficient as large as 40.44 for the logarithm of the GDP. However, the actual 
impact of our coefficients is not very high, since a 1% increase in the real GDP per 
capita only causes a 0.457 percentage point increase in private sector credit.
The inflation indicator (cpiit) is shown to significantly hold back the 
development of private sector credit in the 58 developing countries (see Table 2). 
A one percentage point increase in cpiit is likely to reduce pscit by 0.01 percentage 
point. This finding is consistent with studies such as that of Aggarwal et al., 2011. 
However, such an effect is not found in the panel regressions of 16 SIDS, implying 
that the level of inflation is not a significant determinant of private sector credit in 
these countries.
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The number of commercial bank branches (lcbbit) significantly promotes private 
sector credit in the panels for both the 58 countries and the 16 SIDS. Together with 
the evidence of endogeneity for lcbbit, this finding supports our hypothesis that 
private sector credit and the financial system’s infrastructure share bidirectional 
causality.
The variable odait positively and significantly contributes to private sector 
credit in the 58 developing countries. However, such an effect is not evidenced 
in the SIDS, either in the sample of 58 developing countries or the sample of 16 
SIDS, which suggests that odait only promotes private sector credit in non-SIDS. 
It is suggested that a one percentage point increase in ODA is associated with a 
percentage point increase of 0.39 to 0.51 in private sector credit (see Table 2) for all 
the countries. On the other hand, the coefficient of the interactive term odait×sidsi 
is negative and significant. Since the coefficient of odait×sidsi is larger, in absolute 
terms, than the coefficient of odai, ODA has a negative impact on private sector 
credit in SIDS. This result is further confirmed by the findings in Table 3, where the 
coefficient of odai is negative but nonsignificant. These findings imply that ODA 
substitutes for private sector credit in SIDS.
Institutional quality as measured by the interaction of two institution indicators 
is found to strongly and significantly promote private sector credit. Such evidence 
is consistent across all regressions in either the sample of 58 developing countries 
or the sample of 16 SIDS.
Further robustness analysis (Table 4) finds that not only the effects of 
remittances, the number of bank branches, ODA, and institutions on private sector 
credit remain the same as discussed in the above context, but the growth of real 
GDP per capita and inflation have the same effects as their respective substitutes, 
namely, the real GDP per capita and the CPI. This result provides evidence of 
robust estimates.
Table 2.
Determinants of Private Sector Credit in Developing Countries
This table reports system GMM estimation results. The dependent variable: private sector credit (pscit) while the 
independent variables are noted in column 1. The data sample covers 58 developing countries over the period 2004-
2016. The pici dummy variable has the value of one if a country is a PIC and zero otherwise; the sidsi dummy variable 
has the value of one is a country is a SIDS and zero otherwise. Z statistics are in parentheses; p-values are in square 
brackets. Asterisks *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. These are 
obtained based on one-tailed hypothesis test given the hypotheses described in the model. Zα=0.10 = 1.28, Zα=0.05 = 1.64, 
and Zα=0.01 = 2.33. There is no multicollinearity issue with the regression model. Coefficients of pairwise correlation 
among independent variables are all within -0.65 and 0.65. Instrumental variables include the first lag of endogenous 
variable(s) and trade openness. Hansen J test with a p-value great than 0.20 indicates the validity of instrumental 
variables. Hausman test with p-value less than 0.05 indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
lyit 43.56*** 43.29*** 50.64*** 45.56*** 45.73*** 45.7***
(19.23) (19.16) (18.38) (13.34) (13.05) (13.18)
remit .42*** .34*** .46*** .42*** .45*** .48***
(3.48) (2.70) (3.61) (3.28) (3.50) (3.83)
remit×pici .76** .67* .69* .67* .72*
(1.91) (1.69) (1.77) (1.72) (1.89)
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Table 2.
Determinants of Private Sector Credit in Developing Countries (Continued)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
cpiit -0.017
*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013**
(-4.55) (-3.82) (-3.44) (-3.44)
lcbbit 2.63*** 3.27*** 4.18***
(2.61) (3.10) (3.88)
odait .39** .51***
(2.09) (2.70)
odait×sidsi -.42** -.53***
(-1.98) (-2.50)
psit×vait 5.41
***
(3.64)
Period 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16
# countries 58 58 58 58 58 58
Centered R-square 0.3450 0.3491 0.3654 0.3805 0.3881 0.4003
Endogenous variable lyit lyit lyit, cpiit
lyit, cpiit, 
lcbbit
lyit, cpiit, 
lcbbit
lyit, cpiit, 
lcbbit
Hansen J test χ2 [p-value] 0.74[0.38]  1.21[0.26] 0.07[0.79] 0.23[0.63] 0.61[0.43] 0.28[0.59]
Hausman test χ2 [p-value] 33.0[0.00]  31.1[0.00] 41.2[0.00] 38.1[0.00] 40.0[0.00] 42.6[0.00]
Table 3.
Determinants of Private Sector Credit in SIDS
This table reports results from the system GMM based model. The data sample covers 16 SIDS over the period 2004-
2016. The dependent variable: private sector credit (pscit) while the independent variables are noted in column 1. For 
other details refer to Table 2.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
lyit 38.08*** 37.81*** 30.2*** 21.99*** 20.9** 25.9***
(4.57) (4.52) (2.74) (2.04) (1.93) (2.36)
remit 1.01*** .95*** .94*** .58* .55* .69**
(3.67) (2.73) (2.73) (1.70) (1.62) (2.01)
remit×pici .13 .12 .44 .46 .40
(0.25) (0.23) (0.85) (0.89) (0.77)
cpiit 0.025 0.022 0.019 0.021
(1.04) (0.99) (0.84) (0.94)
lcbbit 7.76*** 8.13*** 9.42***
(3.62) (3.70) (4.26)
odait -.08 -.11
(-0.76) (-0.91)
odait×sidsi
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Table 4.
Results from Robustness Test
Results in this table are based on the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimator. The dependent variable: private 
sector credit (pscit) while the independent variables are noted in column 1. Instruments for the differenced equation 
include two lags of endogenous variables and the first-order difference of exogenous variables, and the instrument for 
the level equation is the constant term. gyit is the growth of real per capita GDP; infit is inflation rate. The data sample 
covers 58 developing countries over the period 2004-2016. For other details refer to Table 2.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
psci,t-1 .84
*** .85*** .79*** .74*** .75*** .75***
(28.67) (28.11) (30.04) (31.92) (31.55) (31.69)
gyit .16
** .16** .16*** .09** .09** .08**
(2.39) (2.29) (2.59) (2.21) (2.03) (1.95)
remit .18** .26** .15* .14* .14*
(2.28) (2.06) (1.83) (1.77) (1.79)
remit×pici .41 .27 .23 .24 .28
(1.47) (1.10) (1.20) (1.28) (1.49)
infit -.22
*** -.21*** -.22*** -.21***
(-12.12) (-10.58) (-10.62) (-10.25)
lcbbit 3.03*** 3.36*** 3.28***
(5.03) (5.16) (5.04)
odait .25
** .25**
(2.28) (2.30)
odait×sidsi -.33*** -.33***
(-2.71) (-2.70)
psit×vait 3.46***
(3.32)
constant 6.56*** 4.43** 7.79*** -6.92** -9.68*** -8.89***
(5.23) (2.48) (4.97) (-2.10) (-2.59) (-2.38)
Period 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16
# countries 58 58 58 58 58 58
Endogenous variable gyit gyit gyit infit
gyit infit 
lcbbit
gyit infit 
lcbbit
gyit infit 
lcbbit
Table 3.
Determinants of Private Sector Credit in SIDS (Continued)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
Coeff. 
(z stat)
psit×geit 6.80
***
(2.72)
Period 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16 2004-16
# countries 16 16 16 16 16 16
Centered R-square 0.0545 0.0556 0.0834 0.1677 0.1732 0.1948
Endogenous variable lyit lyit lyit lyit lyit lyit
Hansen J test χ2 [p-value] 0.70[0.40] 0.65[0.41] 0.33[0.56] 0.01[0.93] 0.02[0.88] 0.001[0.97]
Hausman test χ2 [p-value] 25.7[0.00] 25.8[0.00] 20.8[0.00] 19.4[0.00] 19.2[0.00] 19.5[0.00]
Impact of Remittances on Private Sector Credit in the Pacific Island Countries 27
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of remittance inflows on private 
sector credit in PICs. The study uses system GMM estimators and data from 58 
developing countries over the period 2004–2016. We use a PIC dummy to identify 
the impact of remittances on private sector credit in PICs. The results show that 
remittances have a positive impact on private sector credit in developing countries; 
however, the impact is substantially higher for PICs. Besides remittances, the real 
GDP per capita and ODA, the number of bank branches, and institutional quality 
are also positively associated with private sector credit in all countries, while the 
CPI is negatively associated with private sector credit. In contrast, we find that 
ODA has a negative impact on private sector credit in SIDS.
Overall, the findings show that remittance inflows play a crucial role in 
promoting private sector credit and financial sector development in the PICs. 
Policymakers in PICs should formulate policies to encourage emigrants to send 
remittances through formal mechanisms by providing electronic banking services 
to foster growth in liquidity, improve financial literacy, and build greater trust 
between banks and households.
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